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Context in Construction Grammar

Construction Grammar (CxG) defines constructions as holistic or very frequent form-meaning pairings at all levels of linguistic. The constructions of a given language form a structured inventory. Knowledge of language means knowledge of constructions and their network. Most CxGs assume that pragmatic information, e.g. co(n)textual information, can be integrated into constructions. However, only few studies have done this so far. This paper aims to systematically integrate co- and contextual information into construction grammar. The exemplary test case will be some constructions in English signalling futurity. The four major ways of expressing futurity in present-day English are:

- (1-a) John WILL make a toast.
- (1-b) John IS GOING TO make a toast.
- (1-c) John MAKES a toast tonight.
- (1-d) John IS MAKING a toast (tonight).

All four constructions share a core of meaning (S to the left of E and R), but there are also complex co-occurrence restrictions and subtle differences in meaning: (1-a) makes general predictions about future events, (1-b) implies immediacy and/or plans underway; (1-c) implies “future facts”, (1-d) certain arrangements underway, though the future event could still be cancelled. In terms of co-occurrence restrictions, we find that (1-a) and (1-b) are both modifiable by time adverbials. Adding tomorrow makes (1-a) more certain, and it lowers the immediacy overtone in (1-b). (1-c) is almost unacceptable without modification by a time adverbial; (1-d) is ambiguous unless modified. Moreover, (1-a) basically allows for almost all subject types, animate (agentive) and inanimate. Still, first person subjects in this context can lead to ambiguities between epistemic readings (prediction), and root readings (volition, i.e. resolve and willingness). This effect is further strengthened if dynamic or intentional action verbs are present.

This paper argues that these phenomena can be elegantly captured in CxG. The meaning (differences) are based not on the polysemy of single verbs or adverbials, as is often assumed, but on the construction AS A WHOLE and its context (e.g., shared (world) knowledge, co-text etc.). The ambiguities in (1-a) with first person subjects can be modeled as polysemy links between related constructions, since these constructions (epistemic and root) share the same syntactic configuration, but show distinctive meanings. These can be distinguished through contextual factors, or grammatical configurations: Ambiguity usually does not arise with other person subjects; these structures are uniquely ascribed to the epistemic construction. (1-d) only gains its specific meaning either in context or through the appropriate adverbials. In (1-c), the adverbial slot is obligatory in most cases, though, even here, cotextual factors might suffice to disambiguate the simple present construction from the future construction. However, on a critical note we also need to ask in how far we need to refer to grammatical factors, and when simple ad-hoc pragmatic reasoning suffices for the speaker/hearer in en-/decoding the meaning of the utterance.

It is thus suggested that future constructions have an (optional) syntactic and semantico-pragmatic slot which can be filled by either implicature through context or specific morphosyntactic items that provide that context. With reference to frame semantics and scripts, this paper develops a unified account for future constructions with and without

(semi)auxiliaries in which different semantico-pragmatic functions are distinguished as the meanings of different but related construction types.

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**On center-embedding and finite-state models of language abstract:
grammatical context matters**

Connectionist (finite-state) models fail totally in tasks involving combinatorial computations, such as natural language syntax and semantics. The basic reason lies in their inability to see wider linguistic contexts. However, in an interesting recent paper ("Constraints on multiple center-embedding of clauses", *Journal of Linguistics*, 2007), Karlsson has argued that the available evidence from human linguistic capacities does not warrant the postulation of a recursive-combinatorial linguistic system. Instead, a finite-state system is posited. His argument is based on the corpus-based fact that natural language(s) does(/do) not exhibit unlimited center-embedding (e.g., relative clauses adjoined to subjects iteratively). Karlsson's argument is countered here on the following grounds: (i) center-embedding is not crucial and is not used in demonstrating recursion in cognition; (ii) iterative center-embedding is not crucial in demonstrating recursion in language; (iii) it makes little sense to think that cognition is recursive but language isn't; (iv) the finite-state hypothesis itself is out of question, there being currently no serious finite-state alternative which to evaluate empirically; (v) a grammatical model in which center-embedding is not recursive leads into a questionable theory of language, because near-trivial rules such as 'the subject of a clause can be modified by a relative clause' are not possible; (vi) Karlsson never presents anything against the standard alternative explanation, which says that some grammatical constructions are difficult to process rather than being ungrammatical (e.g. 'the horse ran past the fence fell'); finally, (vii) in the end Karlsson admits, countering the earlier claims made in the article and in the abstract, that the constraints on center-embedding should not fall on the theory of grammar to explain, but should instead be explained as emerging from the 'gray area' between grammar and performance. In conclusion, although the paper adds much to our understanding of the limits of human language capacities and contains very interesting data for anybody to explain, it does not support the finite-state approach.

Fiktiivisestä muutoksesta *jäädä*-verbin yhteydessä. Suomi-unkari kontrastiivinen tarkastelu

Jäädä verbin rektiona oleva tulosija on saanut suomen kielen tutkimuksessa runsaasti huomiota (ym. Rahkonen 1977, Fong 1997, Dhal 1987, Huumo 2005, Huumo 2007). On väitetty, että *jäädä* verbin tulosijalla ilmaistu paikallissijamääräite on suomen kielen erikoispiirre. Edelleen on yritetty löytää selityksiä siihen, miksi *jäädä* verbin rektiossa on dynaamisuus mukana, vaikka verbi ilmaiseekin periaatteessa paikkaan/olotilaan jäämistä, eli staattisuutta. Huumo (2005, 2007) yritti selittää verbin paikallissijamääräitteen tulosijaisuutta pääosin ”fiktiivisen muutoksen” käsitteen avulla: ”lauseen kuvaama tilanne kontrastoidaan projisoituun, toteuttamatta jäävään kehityskulkuun” (Huumo 2005: 507).

Esitelmässäni haluaisin lähestyä *jäädä*-verbiä kahdelta taholta. Ensin haluaisin vertailla kontrastiivisesti *jäädä* verbiä suomen ja unkarin kielessä, osoittaakseni, että tulosijaisuus tai dynaamisuus on *jäädä* verbin yhteydessä myös unkarin kielessä mahdollista ja jopa tavallista, vaikka verbin peruseritys vaatiikin unkarissa rektiona olosijaa. Tulosijainen rektio/dynaaminen interpretaatio on unkarissa kontekstiriippuvainen.

Työn unkari-suomi kontrastiivinen osa perustuu perussanakirjan (PS 2006) *jäädä* verbin osalla esitettyihin esimerkkilauseisiin sekä niiden unkarin käännöksiin. Suomenkielisiä esimerkkilauseita oli yhteensä 54, joista 25 tapauksessa unkarissa dynaamisuus oli jollain tavalla läsnä: sijassa, prefiksissä, tai liikettä ilmaisevassa verbissä, jota tarvittiin lauseen kääntämiseen, kyse oli siis suomen kohdalla melkein puolessa osassa esimerkkejä ”todellisesta” eikä vain ”fiktiivisestä” dynaamisuudesta.

Toiseksi vertailen suomen *jäädä* ja *pysyä* verbejä idiomien yhteydessä. Näytän, että *jäädä* verbiin sisältyvä fiktiivinen muutos on läsnä myös niissä idiomeissa, joihin *jäädä* verbi on vakiintunut. Tarkkailen ensisijaisesti *jäädä* verbiä sisältäviä idiomeja Saarioinen-Varga (2009) suomi-unkari idiomisanakirjasta, joista käy ilmi, että lähes kaikki *jäädä* verbin ympärille rakentuneet idiomit ilmaisevat jotain negatiivista, sellaista tapahtumaa, joka eroaa projisoidusta ja toteuttamatta jääneestä kehityskulkusta. Esim.: *jäädä jonon hännille, jäädä tyhjän päälle, jäädä kelkasta, jäädä unholaan* jne. Monissa esimerkeissä *jäädä* verbiä voi jopa vaihtaa *joutua* verbiin, joka ilmaisee vielä selvemmin, että kyse on ei-volitionaalisesta tapahtumasta/tilanteesta. Idiomien unkarinkielisiin käännöksiin sisältyy usein kieltosana. Toisin *pysyä* verbin ympärille rakentuneet idiomit kuvailivat enimmäkseen positiivisia tai neutraalisia tilanteita. Esim.: *Pysyä leivässä, pysyä kärryillä, pysyä tapetilla*. Voi myös huomata, että monelle *jäädä* verbiä sisältävälle idiomille löytyy vastakohta *pysyä* verbiä sisältävien idiomien joukosta. Idiomit, joihin *jäädä* verbi on vakiintunut, voivat siis antaa lisää konteksteja, jotka tukevat sitä näkemystä, että *jäädä* verbin paikallissijaiseen tulosijaisuuteen yksi pääsyy on jonkin tapahtuman tai tilan/tilanteen kontrastointi projisoituun, toteuttamatta jääneen kehityskulkuun.

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Multimodal interaction analysis and route negotiation in cars

Multimodal interaction analytic research draws on particular understandings of ‘meaning’, ‘context’ and ‘cognition’. It investigates how social interactants construct and display their understandings of actions and events, moment-to-moment, in sequentially unfolding interaction. The data come video recordings of different real-life, real-time situations. Theoretically, the methodology builds on Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodology, while the analytic theory and methodology draw from the empirical work and findings in conversation analysis (CA). CA has provided detailed analyses of how actions are organized sequentially and formed in social interaction (Schegloff 2007).

Multimodal interaction analysis focuses specifically on how social interactants use and rely on language, gestures, the body, artefacts and other multimodal resources for constructing and understanding actions and events in situated social interaction (see for example Goodwin 2000). This approach builds on specific understandings of ‘meaning’, ‘context’ and ‘cognition’. First, meanings are constructed and understood intersubjectively in social interaction. Interactants also rely on various different resources (language, gesture, artefacts) to construct and understand meanings in interaction. Second, context is approached in two ways. On the one hand, an action is always shaped by an immediately previous action (context-shaped) and it always constructs a particular context for a next action (context-renewing) (Heritage 1984). On the other hand, context refers to the semiotically rich environment, the contextual configuration (Goodwin 2000), the features of which participants can orient to in order to construct and understand actions. Finally, cognitive phenomena are seen to be realized and understandable as embodied actions in interaction. In the talk, these above aspects of ‘meaning’, ‘context’ and ‘cognition’ will be discussed and supported with the help of analyses that are based on participants’ observable actions in naturally-occurring social interaction. The data come from route negotiations inside cars and show how people negotiate short and long routes, what linguistics features are central for route negotiation, how and when (pointing) gestures are used in route negotiation, and how landmarks become a central aspect of route negotiation.

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A Random Forest Model for Contextually Induced Person Marking Strategies

The strategies employed in indexing reference to person vary across languages (see Siewieriska 2004). In general, languages employ grammaticalized linguistic markers to track references across linguistic units. In the literature on person reference, several general principles guiding the choice of referential form have been suggested. Sacks and Schegloff (1977) emphasize the general preference for minimization in reference to persons. They also note a general preference for recipient design: speakers should use reference forms which allow the recipient to identify (“recognize” in Sacks and Schegloff’s terminology) the referent. Similarly, Levinson (2007) proposes several principles which according to him guide the indexing of person, most importantly, economy, recognition and circumspection. These principles of tracking person across linguistic units are functionally motivated and conflict with the notion of *pro*-drop, considered to be a semantically empty category, utilized in formal approaches. Contrary to the claims made in formal approaches, the linguistic encoding of person is nontrivial and, moreover, it is contextually motivated (cf. Holmberg, Nayudu & Sheehan 2009).

In this paper, we will discuss person marking strategies in colloquial Finnish. Our aim is to show how the linguistic form used to encode person is predictable on the basis actual patterns of language use. The data come from recordings of Finnish conversations. The data have been analyzed according to several features: structure of the subject (zero vs. pronoun vs. full NP), case marking of the subject, semantic class of the subject referent, distance of subject from the predicate, syntactico-semantic type of the predicate verb, presence of object. For this paper, we focus on the variation of pronoun versus zero encoding of person. By introducing the notion of contextually induced person marking strategies, it is possible to predict fairly accurately the actual form used in discourse.

While various person marking strategies have been proposed in the literature, statistical models are still generally lacking. Recently, statistical models have emerged which can handle linguistic data in a more natural way. In this paper, we utilize a Random Forest Algorithm to demonstrate the predictability of person marking strategies and to evaluate the proposed contextual features (C. Strobl, Hothorn & Zeileis 2009; Carolin Strobl, Malley & Tutz 2009). Generally, this algorithm is able to make accurate predictions in noisy data sets. Moreover, it is capable of handling even small data sets with a relatively high number of independent variables compared to regression models. In this vein, the Random Forest Algorithm can be considered to be a cognitively plausible model for linguistic processing. The utilization of this statistical model allows us to evaluate a fine-grained analysis of linguistic data and to propose robust and testable generalizations over usage patterns.

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The dynamics of conventionalized context: On the use of Danish directional adverbs

Danish Directional Adverbs (DDA) (for instance *op* ‘up’, *ned* ‘down’, *ud* ‘out’, *ind* ‘in’) are frequently used to profile a specific conceptualization of and relation to places, persons, and institutions within a Motion event (cf. Talmy 2000).

jeg tager op/ned/ud/ind/om/over/hen/hjem/tilbage til lægen
‘I’m going up/down/out/in/around/over[passing an obstacle]/over[passing no obstacle]/home/back to the doctor’

The choice of DDA can be seen as the mapping of a very abstract image schema onto a specific spatial scene, the chosen DDA reflecting the conceptualization by the speaker of what is thought to be the most salient characteristic of the relation between source and goal (the path). In other words, the choice of DDA is influenced by contextual parameters at work in the specific speech situation: the position of the speaker in relation to the goal, the speaker’s knowledge about the spatial setting, etc. However, the choice of DDA is also highly conventionalized and grounded in general world-knowledge and culture-specific social practices. Talking about *stranden* ‘the beach’, the choice of DDA will normally be either *ned* ‘down’ or *ud* ‘out’, due to the conceptualization of beaches as ‘lower places’ compared to the higher mainland, or ‘peripheral places’ compared to the central mainland. In this presentation I will show how different kinds of conventionalized context are kept in the background or made explicit to different degrees in the use of DDA.

First, the basic spatial parameters in the speech situation give rise to an obvious restriction. Speakers will generally try to match the core spatial semantics in DDA with the basic cognitive sense of place and space (moving uphill will make it very difficult to use *ned* ‘down’). But, however obvious, straightforward or “natural” this restriction might seem, it is strongly influenced by language and culture specific conceptualization: spatial reality is often quite complex, and the speaker’s choice of DDA will often draw on well-entrenched, pre-ordered conceptualizations of the world (as in *ned/ud til stranden* ‘down/out to the beach’). Data also show that speakers are taking into account a certain amount of basic spatial situation types (“complex event type” or “reference frame”, cf. Langacker 2000, Talmy 2000), each carrying an inner, socio-culturally anchored logic: the rooms within a house is for instance organized according to a centreperiphery-logic, the bedroom being the most central, private or “inner” room, and the entrance being the most peripheral, public or “outer” room.

Second, I will give a couple of examples of the communicative consequences of the strong conventionalization of the use of DDA. In conversation, the spatial information encoded in DDA is often backgrounded. This means that a precise localization of the source and/or goal (which often has to be inferred, cf. the example with the doctor above) is not in focus and can remain rather imprecise and undisputed (unless the conversation is dealing with navigation, for instance finding one’s way to the doctor); Speaker and Addressee can even refer to the same goal using different DDAs within the same conversation. However, “backgrounded” does not mean meaningless. Speakers pay attention to the use of DDA, and if the Speaker’s use collides strongly with the Addressee’s expectations, he or she might object or ask for further information.

The use of DDA is characterized by the combination of strong conventionalization, based on familiarity and frequent use, and the backgrounded status of the spatial information.

On the one hand, DDAs carry important spatial information reflecting socio-culturally anchored pre-orderings of the world (cf. Bennardo 2009). On the other hand, this information is relying on contextual inference and specified or foregrounded to different degrees in conversation, depending on the focus, attention and common ground of the speakers.

Data are drawn from spontaneous use (and non-use) of DDA in semi-structured interviews with dialect-speaking informants, and from major corpora of standard Danish.

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Concerning the role of context in linguistic typology

Semantic meanings and pragmatic meanings are context-free and context-dependent, respectively. In one crucial sense, then, elucidating the role of context in typological linguistics amounts to elucidating the semantic (*langue*) vs. pragmatic (*parole*) distinction in the same framework.

As far as conditional structures are concerned, Li & Thompson (1981: 646–651) distinguish between three modal meanings expressed by the English verb morphology as follows: ‘Real’ = *If you see my sister, you’ll certainly know that she is pregnant*; ‘Hypothetical’ = *If you saw my sister, you’d know she was pregnant*; ‘Counterfactual’ = *If you had seen my sister, you would have known that she was pregnant*. By contrast, “Mandarin has no such grammatical distinctions”. Rather, in each particular case the meaning “has to be inferred by the hearer from the proposition in the second clause and from his/her knowledge of the world and from the **context** in which the sentence is being used” (emphasis added). Thus, the three meanings are semantic in English but pragmatic in Mandarin. In my talk I will explore some of the implications of this **prototypical** case.

1) As a rule, related semantic meanings are expressed by distinct forms (one-to-one) whereas related pragmatic meanings are expressed by a single form (many-to-one). In our Mandarin example this form happens to be zero.

2) The pragmatic zero has to be distinguished from the semantic zero, i.e. a zero that has non-zero paradigmatic alternatives and expresses a well-established (semantic) meaning which contrasts with the meanings expressed by the non-zero alternatives.

3) The semantic vs. pragmatic distinction is **relative** in the technical sense that it becomes evident at first in a typological/comparative framework. In our example, there is a single spectrum of possible pragmatic meanings in Mandarin corresponding to the three semantic meanings in English.

4) This spectrum must be situated at the semantic (*langue*) level (because there can be no language without semantics), but it is inherently **vague** (as compared with typical semantic meanings). To give another example, Rembarrnga has only one device (= “general subordinated clause”) to express the range of meanings expressed in other languages e.g. by COMP, REL, and ADV structures (cf. McKay 1988).

5) There is also a second sense in which the notion of pragmatic meaning is relative insofar as it is relative to the level of ‘granularity’. For instance, the semantic (modal) meanings of the three English verb forms will in turn be actualized as an indefinite number of context-dependent or pragmatic meanings.

6) In the Mandarin counterparts of the English sentences the pragmatic zero is absolute, if the conditional meaning is expressed simply by the **paratactic** structure *S1 S2*. (To be sure, the possible role of sentence intonation is now being disregarded.) The zero is less than absolute if e.g. the conditional conjunction *jiaru* (‘if’) is added.

7) Parataxis is the zero assumption of interclausal syntax. Current attempts (e.g. by Cristofaro 2003) to project standard COMP vs. REL vs. ADV meanings into paratactic structures of ‘exotic’ languages must be viewed with suspicion. Notice what McKay (1988: 8) says of the just minimally non-paratactic structure of Rembarrnga: “It is important to note that the separation of different ‘types’ or ‘uses’ of these subordinated clauses should be seen as an artefact of the English translation”.

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Construing reader in the context of a magazine

Tutkimukseni käsittelee *lukijan* käsitettä aikakauslehden kontekstissa. Esitelmässäni suhteutan toisiinsa erilaisia lukijan määritelmiä ja pohdin niiden sovellettavuutta, kun aineistona on kokonainen lehti.

Lukijan analyysissä lähtökohtanani on kognitiivisen kieliopin *käsitteistäjä* (Langacker 1999: 218), kielellisen ilmauksen näkökulman lähde. Käsitteistäjä kattaa periaatteessa vuorovaikutustapahtuman kaikki osapuolet, puhujan ja kuulijan (ja kirjoittajan ja lukijan), mutta vastaanottajan osuus on analyysissä jäänyt toistaiseksi lähinnä maininnan asteelle. Kokeilen lukijan analyysiin myös etnometodologisen keskusteluntutkimuksen piirissä kehitettyä *osallistumiskehikkoa* (Goffman 1981: 128–145; Schegloff 2007), joka tuo puhujan ja kuulijan (ja vastaavasti kirjoittajan ja lukijan) tilalle hienosyisemmät kategoriat. *Mallilukija* (Helle ja Töyry 2008, 2009) puolestaan on mediatutkimuksen käsite, joka on kehitelty pitkälti narratologian *sisäislukijan* pohjalta (ks. esim. Iser 1974; Leech & Short 1981: 259–286). Mallilukija on se lukijan idea, jolle toimitus suuntaa tekstin. Sen avulla voidaan havainnollistaa yleisön ja lukijan käsitteitä journalistisissa teksteissä ja niiden tuottamisprosesseissa.

Tutkimuksen aineistona on yhden erikoislehden tekstejä sekä lehden toimituksessa toteutetun kehittämisprojektin materiaaleja. Esitelmä liittyy tutkimushankkeeseen *Mallilukijaa tekemässä*, jossa tavoitteena on yhdistää mediatutkimusta ja kielentutkimusta sekä tarkentaa kirjoittajan ja lukijan käsitteitä erityisesti kognitiivisen kielentutkimuksen teoriakehyksessä.

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How can writers present physical demonstration and information-relevant gestures in written texts?

The idea of “context” of onomatopoeic expressions and onomatopoeic elements in texts is obviously many-sided. Their context, on one hand, is the grammatical construction or constructions these words occur in. On the other hand, context is the activity in which they take part, e.g. narration or description. Also, the text they appear in, as a whole, could be called their context.

These “contexts” are not the issue of this paper; here I bring into consideration a more concrete an idea of context – the physical context of the speaker/writer. Onomatopoeic expressions are imitative: they mimic something in the physical surroundings. Therefore the physical context is active when they are used. In addition, especially onomatopoeic interjections (in Finnish, e.g. *naps*, *poks*, ‘snap’, ‘pop’) are sometimes termed vocal gestures because of their demonstrative and representative nature. Furthermore, onomatopoeic interjections very often are accompanied by representational gestures in speech (e.g. Kita 1997).

When onomatopoeic interjections are used in written texts, what happens to their accompanying gestures and their natural attachment to physical context? In most cases these disappear, but there are ways in which writers can make them visible.

I represent here some of the means of showing gestures in texts. In edited texts, the accompanying movements can be presented with descriptive sentences:

1) *Läksin viemään lakkia isälle asemalle. Ollessani torilla, tästä korvan vierestä meni joku, fiuu, Lea Laaksonen kuvailee ja näyttää mistä luoti suhahti ohi.* (CSC, newspaper text.)

‘I went to take the hat to father to the station. When I was at the market place, just next to my ear, here, went something, whizz, Lea Laaksonen describes and shows where the bullet swished past her.’

On the other hand, writers of Internet texts have more means at their disposal. Quotations marks and asterisk are often used to lift sounds on a different level from the rest of the text. Iconic typography (e.g. capital letters, bigger fonts for loud sounds) is common.

Moreover, there are specialized methods for depicting movements and actions. Asterisks are often used to mark physical demonstration, physically real deeds and actions, as in 2 and 3.

2) *Paras oli kun yks ampui minua silleen PAM PAM *sormet ase-asennossa* ja sanoi, että ne olivat rakkauden ammuksia tjsp. : D* (Internet, interview.)

‘The best was when somebody shot me in a way BANG BANG *fingers in gun position* and said that they were love bullets or something like that. :D’

3) *Sullahan sitten onnistuukin se kuuluisa Martin Riggs -pakkopaitatempaus (Lethal Weapon 2). Varmaan kalautatkin aina sen olkapään takaisin paikoilleen seinänkulmaa tai tolppaa vasten? *krunts* Hyöööääärgh!* (Internet, discussion.)

‘Then you can do that famous Martin Riggs straightjacket trick can’t you (Lethal Weapon 2). Surely you knock that shoulder back to its place against a wall or a post, too? *Crack* Huuuaaargh!’

In this paper I compare the ways in which gestures and physical demonstration are used in speech, and how they can be shown in more or less speech-like texts. I also consider what, as a result, happens to demonstration and demonstrative constructions: they don't entirely disappear but have to accommodate to resources available.

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The problem of contextual meaning of verbs describing attention

The problem of meaning and its relation to the context is considered to be one of the most important in the linguistic study of the present day. Thus, it is universally acknowledged that context, language and meaning are not autonomous but greatly connected to each other. This idea is mainly emphasized by cognitive linguistics, which studies not only words as they are but takes into consideration other factors that influence meaning. So being a multidisciplinary study, cognitive linguistics pays great attention to the extra linguistic data, speech situation and sociocultural environment. These positive features help researchers to clarify the problem of systemic and functional meaning of lexemes. This is of great importance while clarifying the item of the lexical category of attention.

The problem is that psychology of attention defines this phenomenon as one of the most complicated one. It is so because attention cannot exist by itself without any other process and goes along with mental activity, perception on the one hand, and plays an important part in the life of every individual in the struggle for existence, on the other.

At the same time traditional linguistics states that the lexical group of attention includes such word combinations as pay attention, attract attention, devote attention etc. as they not only have certain dictionary definitions, but represent the process of attention quite vividly, for example:

Listeners paid attention to, and remembered, those items that seemed significant to them (BNC, CDU:1048).

Named approach, however, doesn't show the way attention functions together with other psychological processes and how verbs of perception and mental activity can describe the situation of attention in a certain context and specify the way the process is shown.

There are a lot of examples showing how verbs of sense perception and mental activity function as verbs of attention. Here are some of them:

'Watch your step in future,' he rasped in warning, standing up and irritably balancing a bag or two against his leg (BNC, H94:61).

Lord Kirtlington eyed his prospective son-in-law with interest (BNC, HGV:6236).

Mary thought of her father, pushed the thought away, and concentrated on her mother and the family that would be hers in the autumn (Ripley:73-74).

It is clearly seen from the analysis of the examples above that the situation of attention is not only properly shown but specified and characterized in accordance with the way it goes along with perception and mental activity. As such examples cannot be ignored, they need thorough linguistic analysis which in its turn could be properly done from the point of view of the cognitive linguistics.

As it was mentioned above, taking into consideration all the factors (linguistic and extra linguistic) that influence meaning, a concept as a mental model, which unites and categorizes lexemes, can be built and these linguistic data can be properly studied. This is supposed to be described in the presentation.

From concrete to abstract: a case study of the development of adjective usage in childhood

Young children mostly talk about concrete phenomena, using concrete words in their most basic sense. The use of adjectives is scarce, i.e. children talk about different objects and phenomena, but they don't describe or specify them further. With increasing age, the knowledge of word meanings goes beyond the most concrete sense and words are used in different senses in a variety of contexts. Furthermore concrete words are used metaphorically to express abstract meanings, and vice versa, abstract words may by way of reification, be used to denote concrete meanings. But when does this happen? And what kind of abstract meanings do emerge first and in what contexts?

The aim of this study is to explore the trajectory from concrete language use to more abstract language use in later language development. The focus is on word sense from the perspective of Cognitive Semantics, where lexical meanings are considered to be dynamic and sensitive to contextual demands, rather than fixed and stable. This is a corpus based approach to study the developmental path of the production and various usages of adjective-noun combinations, from the age of 10 to adult language use.

A small-scale empirical study of the interpretation of adjective-noun combinations has been carried out in order to find preliminary answers to these questions. All adjective-noun combinations have been annotated and analysed in narratives written by 10, 13 and 17 year old children, adolescents and an adult control group. The framework of Ontologies and construals in lexical semantics (Paradis 2005) provides the basis and methodology for the present study. Paradis distinguishes three types of nominal content structures: first-order meaning structures, second-order meaning structures and third-order meaning structures. First order meaning structures are physical objects that exist in time and space, such as for example PEOPLE, ANIMALS, and ARTEFACTS. Second order meaning structures comprise EVENTS, PROCESSES/ACTIVITIES and STATES, i.e. things that exist in time. Third-order meaning structures are represented as ABSTRACT meanings. Like nouns, adjectives profile both first-order meaning structures, second-order meaning structures and third-order meaning structures. However, most often adjectives are second order meaning structures, namely STATES, expressing simple properties such as 'a thin man' or 'a good book'. The adjective-noun combination is examined as a whole, as well as in its parts. A well known problem with adjectives is that they are not possible to study in isolation, one has to take the noun into account. What is important for the interpretation of adjectives is the nature of the noun and the salience of the aspect of the meaning of the noun that is modified by the adjective. A multiple factor analysis has been carried out, identifying the senses of the nouns (first, second and third order) and what kind of information the adjectives target in the noun.

Preliminary results show that adjective occurrences augment with increasing age. Regarding the abstract adjective-noun combination, a developmental leap seems to take place between the ages 13 and 17.

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The influence of extralinguistic context on the attention to locomotion pattern vs. trajectory in motion event description

To organize our knowledge of the world for the purpose of expressing it in language, we use a mechanism known as schematization: semantic representations are selective and qualitative, rather than all-encompassing and quantitative. When we put our experience into language, we have to choose what aspects of the world we want to focus on, and from what perspective to represent them. The categories we can express through language and the principles guiding our choice of what to say and how to say it have been the object of numerous studies. The semantic domains of space and motion have figured prominently in this area of research for two reasons: spatial cognition is crucial for our day-to-day survival, and it is relatively easy to measure the correlation between spatial features and the language used to express them. This study shows how the knowledge of what agent is performing a motion influences the aspect of that motion we choose to comment on. This is a spinoff from a bigger project on how language encodes information about path curvature, with a focus on three target languages: English, Norwegian and Bulgarian.

The results come from a free description experiment in which native speakers of the three languages had to describe the motions in a series of animated video clips. The video clips were designed to show controlled variation with respect to two features of the motion: the shape of the trajectory, and the agent performing the motion. Although all three target languages have verbs which according to dictionary definitions refer purely to aspects of the trajectory (shape or change of direction), the results show that, irrespective of language, participants used these verbs more often when the agent performing the motion was a vehicle, and less often when the motion was performed by an animal. Several tentative explanations can be offered for such an outcome. One is that instead of being composed of only necessary and sufficient features, word meanings include default information which, until recently, was considered as part of encyclopedic, but not of linguistic knowledge. Another one is that biological motion, unlike mechanical motion, includes a visually salient body cycle, which may compete with path shape for the attention of the observers of the motion scene. A third one is that the vocabulary available in the target languages is much richer with respect to terms describing gait patterns, than it is with terms describing vehicle motion, which, according to linguistic typology work such as Slobin (2006), goes together with a stronger focus to locomotion pattern in a mutually encouraging relationship. The line preferred here is that these three factors work in conjunction to influence the participant's choice of verb when they describe motion scenes. Word meanings are grounded in experience, and therefore extra linguistic context has an important influence on such aspects of language as lexicalization, comprehension and production.

Contexts as causes for misunderstanding

According to traditional thinking, contexts serve as an important bridge to understanding. Indeed, it is easy to find situations of communication where this is true. In an oral dialogue it is a commonplace that we are able to hear only part of the message, and on that basis we fill the gaps with words that suit the context. Another type of context is used in interpreting sentences like John studies Chinese language and literature. Referring to our mental map, we read the sentence as John studies Chinese language and Chinese literature, rather than John studies Chinese language and world literature. An important element of any context is the speaker. For correctly understanding the phrase Finland's economy is going down, an important factor is who is arguing that this is the case: the Prime Minister, an opposition politician, an expert in economics, or a man in a bar after five beers.

My purpose is to show the opposite side of the coin: to demonstrate situations where contexts (to be more precise: different interpretations of the context) are causes for misunderstanding. In doing this I have to classify various types of contexts. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish, among others, the following types of context:

1. **Sound/letter-level context.** It has been shown by the eye-tracking method that speakers of the Dutch language, on hearing the beginning of the word pencil, first think of penguin, and only recognize the right word after hearing it in full. In this case the misunderstanding is immediately corrected by the listener, but can become a genuine problem in a normal speech situation which, as a rule, contains some hindrances to comprehension.
2. **Semantic contexts** consist of the meanings we are used to assigning to words and clauses. In practice, everyone has a different context for every unit of a language. This is an obvious cause of differences in interpretation of speech, especially if we are not aware of these differences.
3. **Syntactic context.** If we slightly modify the sentence mentioned above and say John studies Chinese language and philosophy, different readings may occur. Here again we try to connect the phrase with our experience of the world.
4. **Referential contexts** of the speaker and the listener may differ. So it is evident that John may be put into different contexts, too.
5. **Speech situation context.** An in-group conversation radically differs from the way we speak in a more public situation. Doctors may use a rather brutal language in speaking with their colleagues of their patients. If such speech is put in another context, it causes a serious case of misunderstanding.

In trying to understand each other, we very much rely on the contexts which are familiar to us. The new information is interpreted through the map of knowledge and experience that we have at our disposal. Therefore, we can argue that understanding is by its very nature a process of contextualization.

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The neuronal context of meaning. Some implications on temporal and spatio-visual conceptualizations

Within current cognitive linguistics, there exists a strong need for extending the analytical scope of the theory from armchair-based introspection to the “real” manifestations of language (such as verbal communication and written discourses). However, the neuronal computation of the brain as well as the human conceptual mechanisms as a whole form a context of language that is, in addition to positing strong constraints on what can be posited (for example, within theory of syntax), an extremely diverse area of theory with open questions highly relevant for linguistic considerations in general. In this paper, I address two of such questions, namely:

- 1.) What are the causal relations between the neuronal oscillation in the brain, the experience of time as felt, and the temporal meaning as construed for expressive ends?
- 2.) What is the neuronal architecture of visual experience, how is it related to the conceptualization of space and how does considerations such as these affect the theory of semantics?

I go about the first question by summarizing my analysis of Finnish adpositions of time. As these adpositions are inherently spatial, they are interpretable as a manifest example of spatial metaphor of time, TIME ORIENTATION as designated by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) or TIME IS SPACE (Fauconnier & Turner 2008). In the recent studies of conceptual metaphor (cf. Dirven & Pörings [eds.] 2003, Panther et al. [eds.] 2009) metonymy has been highlighted as one of the most important sources of motivation for metaphorical expressions. When concerning the inherently spatial means for expressing time, however, metonymy can in fact be assumed as the very mechanism for conceptualizing time online, i.e. producing meaning at the synchronic level. The evidence suggesting this comes from the studies (cf. Evans 2004) treating the neuronal oscillation of the brain as the source of temporal experience, which as fundamental to all cognitive processing may necessitate a categorical temporality of meaning: time as a ubiquitous semantic component that invariably lends itself to contextual metonymical foregrounding.

The case of visual experience and spatio-visual meaning is even further complicated. At the same time, the ontological question of visual imagery as sensed is at the heart of cognitive linguistics. Among cognitive linguists, there seems to exist a consensus about a strong affinity between perceptual experience and following conceptualization (e.g. Langacker 2008). In the field of neuropsychology, however, there is not even consensus about the matter of perceptual experience as such, let alone the following conceptual or preconceptual representations.

When delimiting the scope to visual representations, two competing schools of thought can be separated: 1) the supporters of a strong imagist outlook (e.g. Kosslyn et al. 2006) in which the visual representations are seen as simulating direct perception via neural activation patterns in occipital lobe 2) the propositionalists (e.g. Pylyshyn 2007) to which the “visual” in the representational activity of brain is purely epiphenomenal, while the actual re-activation of information is achieved through an abstract “mentalese”, conveying the skeletal meaning currently needed.

I contrast the main tenets of these two schools to each other and examine the possible semantic-theoretical consequences of choosing a particular neuropsychological stance.

Though the distinction between propositional and imagist outlook comes out less radical than may seem at the outset, the sheer complexity of the issue of mental representations necessitates caution when positing strong semantic generalizations on a readily assumed imagist basis.

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Koputetaan puuta: eleidiomit eli kinegrammit

Idiomien kirjavassa joukossa on alaryhmä, joka koostuu kulttuurisesti konventionaalituneista eleilmauksista, joita germanistisessa fraseologiassa kutsutaan myös kinegrammeiksi, kuten lyödä hanskat tiskiinkin ja kääriä hihat (ks. esim. Dobrovol'skij & Piirainen 2005). Näille ilmauksille on ominaista kaksitulkintaisuus: samaan aikaan voi kyseessä olla konkreettinen ele tai kuvakielinen ilmaus, kuten pudistaa päätään tai viitata kintaalla, toisinaan jopa molempia yhtä aikaa, jos ilmauksen yhteydessä myös tehdään kyseinen ele, kuten koputetaan puuta. Toisinaan elettä taas on vaikea kuvitella oikeasti tehtävän, esim. kun haudataan sotakirves.

Etenkin ruumiinosannimen sisältävistä idiomeista suureen osaan osa liittyy kuvallinen tai symbolinen, toisinaan myös konkreettinen ele, esim. iskeä päätänsä seinään, työntää nenänsä toisten asioihin, kohauttaa olkapäitään tai puristaa jnk kättä (Nenonen 2002). Täysin kaksitulkintaisissa idiomeissa, kuten em. pudistaa päätä ja puristaa jnk kättä, riippuu kuitenkin asiayhteydestä, milloin on kyse myös konkreettisesta eleestä, milloin taas puhtaasti kuvallisesta käytöstä. Tässä esitelmässä esitellään tyypillisiä suomen ruumiinosannimen sisältäviä eleidiomeja ja vertaillaan niiden käyttöä kuvallisessa ja konkreettisessa kontekstissa tekstikorpuksista poimittujen esimerkkien avulla.

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In the interface of grammar and context: the interpretation constructions

In my presentation I will focus on a special type of construction based on assessment and conventionalized interpretation of the situation expressed by the proposition. I call these constructions with linkage to the interaction *interpretation constructions*. The linguistic basis for my discussion is a group of Finnish causative verbs denoting social dominance. These verbs have an argument structure with two active, normally human, participants. An example of such verb is *juoksuttaa* [run-CAUS] 'make someone run' as in (1):

- (1) *Valmentaja juoksuttaa Matilla viisi kilometriä.*
coach make-run Matti-inessive five kilometre-partitive
'The coach makes Matti run five kilometers'

In my paper, I will show that some of these verbs may have special link to particular contextual information. A group of causatives (mostly derived from motion verbs) have a lexicalized power relation: the higher agent (the one that makes the other perform the activity denoted by the root verb) is misusing his/her power over the lower agent (the one that performs the activity). The power misuse relation expressed by causative verbs ('make jump' and 'make run') is illustrated in example (2):

- (2) *Palvelu on yrmeätä vastaanottovirkailijasta lääkäriin. Tuntuu, kuin päätarkoitus on hyppyyttää ja juoksuttaa asiakasta.*
[...] main idea is jump-caus-inf and run-caus-inf client-partitive
'The service is unfriendly all the way from the reception to the doctor. It feels like the main idea is to **make** the client **jump** and **run**.' [I.e. the main idea is to make the client perform unimportant activities.] (<http://www.otakantaa.fi/forum.print.cfm?group=174>, searched 30.8.2005)

The goal of my presentation is to describe the features of the particular context in which the power misuse interpretation is activated and licensed. I argue that the disapproval in connection with (2) is a particularity of this construction; it does not follow directly from the lexical properties of the verb but from the verb-context interface. The link to the context is established by an evaluative perspective on the social dominance situation: the speaker, who itself is an observer of the power misusing situation (s)he is portraying, experiences the dominance relation between the higher agent and the lower agent as negative (the suffering participant the expression refers to, as for instance *asiakas* 'the client' in (2), is not necessarily aware of the abuse). It is thus essential to take into account not only the causation but also the social implications that are associated with the power misuse reading. I suggest that the property of the interpretation construction is the contextual linking as a precondition for the possibility of occurrence of such pattern. There may exist a range of conventionalized interpretative implications from which the language user selects the most appropriate. In addition to the power misuse construction described in (2), I will also discuss some further context-dependent phenomena related to the causative verbs.

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Translation of culture-specific expressions and conceptual blending

Culture-specific expressions include, for example, realia that refer to the real world outside our language and various culture-specific metaphoric expressions that are figuratively linked to the surrounding social reality. Their understanding requires contextual knowledge of the surrounding culture, and they inevitably cause problems to translation. Sometimes they are even claimed to be untranslatable. The main problem here is that it is not possible to fully understand something, when the contextual pragmatic and social knowledge is lacking. One possible practical solution to help solve this problem could be offered by the principles of Blending Theory, which could be applied to these culture-specific, “untranslatable” expressions to systematize their transfer from the source culture context to the target culture context. If we place the problematic culture-specific expression in the source text in input space 1, see which of its essential elements can be generalized in the generic space, and then project its crucial content into input space 2 (which resides in the target culture), we could arrive at a contextually understandable translation of the original culture-specific expression. By applying this method systematically, we could at least alleviate the problems of translating culture-specific expressions that require wider contextual knowledge. In this presentation, I will discuss the possibilities of this idea and show how it can be applied with the help of examples from translations between English and Finnish.

Idiom and its context: a usage-based formal model

The prevailing tendency in idiom studies is to acknowledge the importance of interaction between the idiom and its linguistic context. It is widely accepted that the result of this interaction can affect idiom recognition, comprehension and interpretation especially for ambiguous idioms (Colombo 1993, Peterson et al. 2001, Cacciari et al. 2005). The majority of research concerning context effects in idiom processing has been aimed at showing whether a biasing context primes either the “literal” or the “idiomatic” interpretation of idioms by affecting the temporal course of activation of these meanings, i.e. by making one of them available more quickly (different models of context vs. meaning activation are described in Colombo 1993). But in fact idiomatic interpretation itself can vary depending on the context.

Jackendoff (2002) discusses several approaches to meaning which address the question whether there is a specifically linguistic part of semantics that can be distinguished from contextual meaning. The two ways such separation could be achieved is either by locating contextual meaning to a special level of structure connected to linguistic semantics by the pragmatic interface, or by assuming that linguistic semantics is a subset of contextual meaning. Jackendoff (2002) advocates a view that there is no special level of linguistic semantics except for conceptual structure. Thus, contextual information is integrated with conceptual material derived from linguistic expression by the same conceptual integrative processor, which binds the conceptual structure of a lexical item to part of the thought being expressed. However, in order to establish the contextualized meaning of the utterance, one has to establish its reference.

A crucial part of the Tiernet model of idiom analysis (Petrova forthcoming), presented in the course of this paper, is formalization of the referential claims, which an idiomatic expression makes. It includes a separate level of representation (a referential tier) which explicates cohesive relations that underlie establishing of the contextualized meaning of the expression. It serves as an interface, a point of interconnection between conceptualization of an idiom and conceptualization of its context, or, to be more specific, – elements of the context which can be regarded as co-referential with the elements of the idioms structure. Apparently, contextual interpretation of idioms is secured by their cohesive relation to other elements of context.

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THE AXIOLOGICAL PECULIARITIES OF THE CONCEPTS *MEANING* AND *SENSE*

In general, the problem of the linguistic and philosophical concept *MEANING* has been extensively investigated in modern linguistics and semiotics. In most cases it is viewed in the context of differentiating of its categorial and speech content from that of another important notion of semantics, namely *SENSE*. The problem seems to be rather removed from its perfect solution, and there is a need to view different approaches to solve it.

There seems to be one important aspect characterizing both notions. It is the aspect to analyze them as axiological concepts, i.e. in the plain of the semantic theory of value and evaluation. Practically all the dictionaries viewing these words mark their evaluative use. For instance, “Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary” gives the following definitions of the axiologically marked word-combination *to make sense*:

“9. make sense. 9.1. If something **makes sense**, you can understand it. **EG** *A sentence must make sense...* **9.2.** When you **make sense** of something, you succeed in understanding it. **EG** *He could not make sense of his parents' mood.* **9.3.** If you say that someone **makes sense** or talks sense, you mean that they are saying wise or sensible things. **EG** *On defense matters he talked a great deal of sense.* **9.4.** If a course of action **makes sense**, it seems reasonable and practical **EG** *Under these conditions it made sense to adopt labour-saving methods... It often makes hard economic sense to borrow extra money”*.

If one paraphrases these definitions preserving their semantic content he/she can clearly see that the said word-combination may be easily substituted with the word-combination *to have meaning*. As we see, Definitions 9.1 and 9.2 are deprived of evaluative content, yet the rest are markedly evaluative in their semantic nature. The correlation of these definitions may be expressed in the following conclusion: ‘if a thing has certain meaning, it surely makes sense. But there must be one notional remark – it makes sense in certain conditions, under certain circumstances, in certain situations. The actual situations sometimes show really absurd evaluations from the point of view of conventional morals, common sense etc., as in the following example, where a sadist approves beating a man in his face with the boots:

But it was always the same on the old nogas – real horrorshow bolshy boots for kicking litsos in [A.Burgess. *The Clockwork Orange*].

The analysis of these words thus shows that that the notions of *MEANING* and *SENSE* are correlated with the valuation as a sphere of thought and language as both a system and its realization. In its turn, the correlation between meaning and sense is proportional to the correlation of value and evaluation. Meaning and value are paradigmatic categories whereas sense and evaluation are the syntagmatic ones. Yet the problem still needs a more profound study and seems to be rather a perspective field in the sphere of cognitive linguistics.

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The role of context in synonymy from cognitive perspective

While context has always played an important role in the study of synonyms, cognitive linguistics has introduced new opportunities and provided fertile ground for research in this field. In particular, traditional approach considered synonyms in terms of their equivalence and difference as strict categories, which led to the problem of their definition and criteria of synonymy. The role of context understood mainly as linguistic surrounding of a word was restricted to the problem of synonyms interchangeability.

This paper adopts the assumptions of cognitive linguistics due to which it attempts to fill the gaps in the study of synonyms. One of the major assumptions is known as usage-based thesis from which it follows that language structure can be adequately studied only if language use is taken into consideration. One of the central concepts of this approach is a usage event which is an utterance. It is “a situated instance of language use which is culturally and contextually embedded and represents an instance of linguistic behaviour on the part of a language user” (Evans, Green 2006: 110). So, context is not only seen as linguistic elements of an utterance but rather as knowledge structure, the frame, with which the meaning of the word is associated and against which it is understood (Fillmore 1985).

This research is based upon the data extracted from dictionaries of synonyms, collocations dictionaries and the British National Corpus.

The paper proposes the definition for synonyms as words meanings of which represent enough knowledge to provide access to one and the same concept. Then it shows that there is interdependence between context and synonyms that can be explained by what we call the principle of balance. It states that more definite and specific context gives freedom in the use of synonymous words and vice versa. Less concrete context requires that the speaker uses rather one word than another to avoid ambiguity and to represent the concept in the most accurate way.

Then results of this research indicate that two types of synonymy can be defined. We call them intra- and inter-frame synonymy. The first type is represented by lexical items the meanings of which highlight different subparts of the frame. The second type encompasses words the meanings of which represent one and the same salient subpart of different frames.

The Role of Context in Translation: Cognitive Perspectives

Context has long been considered an essential factor for the interpretation and translation. However, the variety of approaches, studying context, their methods and tenets still need clarification.

Here we agree with cognitive semanticists, who do not regard context as an addition to meaning, but a pivotal part of it. In fact, both linguistic and situational contexts are closely interwoven in the meaning of the word, reflecting the knowledge of the world, representing by different cognitive models: concepts, frames (Fillmore), domains (Langacker), mental spaces (Fauconnier), scripts (Shank & Abelson) etc.

In the process of translation we interpret an utterance, activating in our mind the encyclopaedic knowledge about the object of translation, that is, one of the cognitive models. It is a very complicated process, when we translate from English into Russian, but it shows our knowledge of the object and our ability to form the concept of it. Thus, we move from meaning to context. Then we try to form the similar context in Russian, activating the knowledge about the similar object, and searching for the lexical units, capable to represent the same concept. At this stage we move from context to meaning. The similar process is observed, when we translate from Russian into English.

The problem is that the context always comes first. If we do not know the context of an object in English, we will not be able to translate the utterance with this object correctly. Thus, the statement given above, that we can move from meaning to context, is rather conventional. To interpret the meaning, we should know the context. To know the context we should activate a network of interwoven concepts.

Consider the translation of the following sentences:

- 1) He had a strong passion for reading.
- 2) He was choked with passion.

We form two conceptual models for the English and Russian language minds:

English Concept "PASSION" embodies such components as: "strong emotion", "love", "desire", "interest", "torment", "rage", "fury", "anger" etc.

Russian Concept "Strast" consists of such components as: "strong emotion", "love", "desire", "interest", "torment", "fear", "very (intensifier)" etc.

It is obvious that both Russian and English concepts have some similar components, but they have some discrepancy as well.

As for Sentence 1, we have the same context in both languages; therefore we can translate it closely to the meaning: "Он испытывал сильную страсть к чтению". We profile the conceptual components "desire", "interest", "strong".

If we try to translate Sentence 2, we will fail to do it with the word "strast" in Russian, because Russian Concept does not contain the components "rage", "fury", "anger". We will have to search for some other linguistic means to express the same context: "Он весь кипел от злости".

The analysis of other cases shows the necessity of using de-contextualization of the original unit and re-contextualization for the target one. These processes, based on the procedures of conceptual analysis, help to get a good contextualized translation.

Context in interjectional meaning-making

Interjections have been classified both as word-like and sentence- (or utterance-) –like; they have been denied linguistic status or exiled at the periphery of language as a bizarre, primitive form of communication, as pseudo-linguistic devices or as arbitrary performance errors. They have been characterized as phonologically, syntactically and semantically anomalous. Ever since antiquity, Western grammarians have admitted that the words grouped in the class of interjections pose a challenge to semantic analysis since their meaning could not be satisfactorily described without resorting to contextual cues. However, with the advent of functional and interactional approaches, and corpus-based analysis using spoken language, the interest for interjections has grown.

Drawing on a detailed conversational and cognitive analysis of the 12 most frequent primary interjections (i.e. vocalizations of the type *ah*, *eh*, *oh*, etc.) in Romanian and Italian, as established by their occurrence in an extensive corpus of spontaneous interactions in each language (both personal and published), but also on a broad array of secondary data in a variety of other languages, I will outline a way of addressing interjectional meaning-making with the help of context (by taking into account, among others, specific communicative goals and social cognitive processes). In this integrative approach which relies on lessons taught by speech act theory, symbolic interactionism, conversation analysis and cognitive approaches to language processing and communication, linguistic meaning is viewed as dynamic and emergent rather than stored and invariably activated. Such a view allows for a contextualized description of the meaning-making processes, as a situated coordination of linguistic, cognitive, social-cognitive, interactional and socio-cultural resources. The focus will be on how context can be classified based on actional, interactional, cognitive and socio-cognitive criteria and how both previous and subsequent adjacent context interact in interjectional meaning-making.

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Jos-lause lasten filosofisissa keskusteluissa

Esitelmäni on osa syksyllä 2008 aloitettua tutkimushanketta, jossa tarkastellaan, miten lasten argumentointitaidot kehittyvät alakouluvuosien aikana sekä miten lasten argumentointitaitojen kehittymistä voidaan tukea alakoulussa. Tutkimukseeni osallistuu yksi Oulun Normaalikoulun oppilasryhmä, joka opiskelee filosofiaa yhden oppitunnin verran viikoittain. Oppilasryhmän filosofian tunteja videoidaan vuosittain vähintään yhden kuukauden ajan, ja tämänhetkinen aineistoni koostuu vuosina 2008 ja 2009 kerätystä videoaineistosta. Tarkastelen erityisesti oppitunneilla käytyjä filosofisia (opetus)keskusteluja.

Alustava perehtyminen tutkimusaineistoon on osoittanut, että oppilaiden keskusteluissa on erityisen paljon *jos*-lauseita:

- (1) 01 Aamu: no **jos** mä meen Marin luokse ja otan sen korvan takkaa kolikon niin
02 uskooko joku että se on oikee kolikko?
03 Ari: no en.
05 Aamu: **jos** sää meet kauppaan ja ostat sillä ja se kauppias hyväksyy sen
06 uskotko sitte?
07 Ari: no **jos** nää vaikka meet jonku ko-ko-korvan takkaa jonku kolikon ottamaan
08 niin sittehän voi olla hiassa se kolikko,
- (2) 01 Anu: no liikennesäännötki on tärkeitä **jos** niinku vaikka ei ois liikennevaloja tai
02 silleen,
03 Opettaja: yy.
04 Anu: niin sillonhan ajettais kolareita **jos** ei ois mittää sääntöjä (--) vois ajjaa vaikka
05 toisella kaistalla **jos** ei ois sääntöjä,
- (3) 01 Opettaja: voitko sää sanoa semmosta mitä ei ole olemassa,
02 Erja: ei sitä voi sanoa ku **jos** sitä ei oo olemassa (.) sittehän se on olemassa **jos** sen
03 sanoo,
04 Opettaja: onko niin että **jos** sinä sanot jonkun (.) että jonku asian niin se on
05 olemassa,

Esimerkkien havainnollistama *jos*-lauseiden runsaus saa kysymään, miksi *jos*-lauseet ovat niin tavallinen piirre aineistoni opetuskeskusteluissa ja millaisia funktioita niillä on lasten filosofisissa keskusteluissa. Etsin vastausta kysymyksiin tarkastelemalla aineistoani erityisesti sosiaalisen ja sosiokulttuurisen kontekstin näkökulmasta (esim. Fetzer 2007: 12–16).

Lähteet:

Fetzer, Anita 2007: Context, contexts and appropriateness. – Anita Fetzer (toim.), Context and Appropriateness. 3–27. Amsterdam: John Benjamin's Publishing Company.

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On the Interaction of the Linguistic System and Socio-Cultural Strategies

The system of language constitutes a core module installed in the systems of communication and cognition. The system of communication internalizes modules of social and cultural strategies, in the sense that the social and cultural strategies govern the effectiveness of linguistic strategies that are in turn governed by the grammar of the language. Adopting the general insights of Game Theory, we will interpret what we call the effectiveness of communicative strategies in strategic terms to capture the relative evaluations of the strategies of the modules that crucially interact with each other in specifiable strategic communicative environments. We will take up newly extended uses of an adverb of the Japanese language in deliberately ambiguous communicative environments.

Before we go on to examine the new uses of the adverb, let us give a game-theoretical account of a language change that occurred and spread in a short period of time in the Japanese language. The linguistic change gave rise to a morphologically simpler form through the deletion of the syllable *ar*, as illustrated as follows:

(1) Variants of the Inflectional Ending

- a. *taber-u* “eat”
eat-INFINITIVE
- b. *taber-arer-u* “edible”
eat-ABLE-INFINITIVE
- c. *taber-er-u* “edible”
eat-ABLE-INFINITIVE

It is crucial to note that the form in (1b) can be passive and ambiguous:

(2) *Taber-arer-u* in the Passive Construction

Ringo-wa	tori-ni	taber-arer-u
apples-TOPIC	birds PASSIVE PARTICLE	pick-PASSIVE-PRES

Contrastively, the clipped form in (1c) is not ambiguous and it cannot be in the passive construction:

(3) Corresponding Clipped Form

*Ringo-wa tori-ni taber-er-u

We observe that the case of the morphological varieties of *arer* in Japanese strongly suggests that the linguistic change is directed toward the domain where linguistic strategies are in a win-win situation for the speaker and the listener: the phonological simplification of the consecutive three *r*'s with respect to Obligatory Contour Principle (Leben (1973)) and the semantic disambiguation. Note that a process of contextual disambiguation is supplemented to properly interpret the ambiguous construction as in (2).

A newly extended use is observed with respect to the adverb of evaluation, *futuu-ni* “ordinarily, commonly” in the Modern Japanese. Japanese speakers of older generations do not place the adverb in the position to modify adjectives, while they use it as a manner adverb:

(4) *Futuu-ni* in Verb and Adjective Phrases

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------|
| a. futuu-ni | aruk-u |
| ordinarily | walk ENDING |
| “walk ordinarily” | |
| b. ?futuu-ni | oishi-i |
| ordinarily | delicious |
| “delicious ordinarily” | |

Younger generations unanimously accept the use of adverb to modify adjectives, as found in (4b). Crucially, the adjective phrase in (4b) is ambiguous, which also signifies that the food is much more delicious than the young expected. Thus, we may negate the negative possibility that the food is tasteless, rather redundantly as in (5):

- (5) futuu-ni oishi-i mazuk-u nai
tasteless ENDING NEGATION

Thus, the listeners are expected to interpret and infer what the speaker left unsaid, and it is significant to note that the cook saves his/her face. In the language of the older generations, they can just use *oishi-i*, which may in some cases be felt to be excessively flattering for him/her. To interpret this game-theoretically, the extension of the adverb *futuu-ni* to modify adjectives provides a win-win situation with the linguistic community to explicitly avoid face-threatening acts (Brown and Levinson (1987)) on any of the members.

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Merkityksen pelkistymisestä

Esitelmäni tarkoitus on havainnollistaa kielitieteellisin ja muin esimerkein seuraavia seitsemää väitettä, jotka koskevat merkityksen pelkistymistä:

1. **Käytämme liian helposti sanaparia *abstrakti käsite*.** Esimerkki: *The Oxford English Dictionary* –sanakirja, jossa sanojen etymologioita ei aina ole pystytty todentamaan, mutta konkreettisen merkityksen on aina oletettu edeltävän abstraktia. Toinen esimerkki: Käsittemetaforan teoriassa á la George Lakoff ja Mark Johnson käsitteitä jaetaan konkreettisiin ja abstrakteihin pureutumatta kovin syvälle konkreettisuuden ja abstraktin käsitteisiin (*Metaphors We Live By, The Body in the Mind*).
2. **Olettamus, että abstraktit käsitteet perustuvat konkreettisiin on pahimmillaan tautologinen nollaväite.** Esimerkki: Kun konkreettisia asioita on riittävän monta tai niillä ei ole selkeää muotoa, ne on pakko hahmottaa pelkistetyksi kokonaisuutena (*pilvi > pilvet > pilvistö > pilvipeite*). Tämä ei kuitenkaan muuta lähtökohtaisesti konkreettista asiaa ei-konkreettiseksi (pilvi pysyy yhä fysikaalisena ilmiönä), vaan helpommin tai tietyllä tavalla hahmotettavaksi, mikä itse asiassa sisältyy verbin *abstrahointi* merkitykseen.
3. **Kyseessä olevaa ongelmien – tai mahdollisuuksien – kenttää voidaan mainiosti käsitellä suomen kielen verbien *pelkistää* ja *pelkistyä* avulla.** Esimerkki: Liitämme usein *abstraktin* mielessämme *aineettomaan* tai *monimutkaiseen*, mutta *pelkistäminen* on parhaimmillaan *yksinkertaistamista*.
4. **Jo pelkästään mielenterveytemme kannalta on erittäin tärkeää sekä *yleistää* (*pelkistää, abstrahoida*) että *eriyttää* (*konkretisoida, nimetä, spesifioida*).** Esimerkki: Mitään korkeakoulua tai yritystä ei voida johtaa käsittelemällä joka kokouksessa joka asian yhteydessä erikseen jokaista työntekijää, vaikka samalla ja samoja asioita on hoidettava myös henkilökohtaisella tasolla.
5. **Sekä *yleistämällä* että *eriyttämällä* on oma tehtävänsä.** Kumpikaan ei sulje toista pois tai automaattisesti tarkoita, että toinen tapa käsitellä asioita olisi monimutkaisempi. Esimerkki: Kun lapsille opetetaan matematiikkaa, heti alusta alkaen sekä yleistetään (esimerkiksi esineitä käsitellään numeroina) että eriytetään (“kuinka monta omenaa Pirkko saa, jos ...?”).
6. **Näinkin yksinkertainen asioiden jäsentäminen voi auttaa meitä ymmärtämään kieltä uudella tavalla.** Esimerkki: Monet abstraktit käsitteet kuten *tiede* ovat johdettavissa ihmisen toimintaan ja merkinnevät paitsi eri ihmisille hieman eri asioita myös eri ihmisille enemmän tai vähemmän abstrakteja asioita. Vertaa esimerkiksi henkilöä, joka suorittaa joka päivä teknisiä tieteellisiä mittauksia lapseen, joka ei ole koskaan käynyt museossa tai tiedekeskuksessa tai muussa sellaisessa, eikä kokenut tiedettä konkreettisena asiana.
7. **Tässä esittämäni yksinkertaiset väitteet voivat myös auttaa meitä katsomaan ja ymmärtämään paremmin käsitteitä.** Esimerkki: Toisinaan ilmaistaan huolta siitä, kykenemmekö erottamaan viihde- ynnä muun tekniikan ihmissuhteista. Mahdollisten ongelmien synnyn voi selittää esimerkiksi siten, että on ihmisille luonteenomaista pelkistää asioita. Tästähän on usein kyse jo tekniikkaa suunniteltaessa.

Lopuksi: Väitän siis, että jokainen kielitieteellinen ilmaisu on jo itsessään monimuotoinen konteksti ja metaforisesti ilmaisten leikkaa käsiteltäväksemme tietynlaisen siivun laajemmasta kontekstista.

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Contextual factors in word-formation: a study of the diminutive suffix *-inho* in Brazilian Portuguese

This study questions the centrality of the semantic notion of diminished size in the description of the diminutive *-inho* in Brazilian Portuguese. Both grammatical and descriptive traditions tend to consider the idea of small size as the most relevant aspect of the diminutive *-inho*, leaving other values and functions into a secondary position, subordinate to this “core meaning”. This can be seen as the result of a long tradition of linguistic research that restricts the legitimate object of the research to the linguistic material consisting of context-independent words or phrases. Even though the relevance of the context is currently being more and more recognized in the linguistic theorization, in practice of the research the contextual aspects are not always given due attention. When it comes to the Morphological studies of word formation processes, the analyses tend to concentrate on the interaction between the base word and the affix independently of the surrounding elements. In this study, we argue that the inclusion of the wider contextual and situational aspects in the analysis of word formation processes in general, and of the diminutive formation process in particular, is fundamental in order to cast any light on the meaning potential of such processes.

The study is based on theoretical contributions of Cognitive Linguistics, and its empirical part draws from methodologies offered by Corpus Linguistics. The Cognitive perspective rejects the vision of language that presupposes a stable semantic nucleus to the meaning of linguistic units, and argues that the meaning of a word cannot be conceived independently of the context and of the vast repertory of associated encyclopedic knowledge. The methodological possibilities of the Corpus Linguistics allow to empirically observe the use that the speakers actually make of the resources of the language.

In order to reveal to what extent the suffix *-inho* is in fact used to convey smallness-related meanings, and to what extent it expresses other types of pragmatic and discursive functions, an analysis of the diminutive occurrences on a mid size corpus of current Brazilian Portuguese speech was carried out. A computer-readable oral corpus consisting of 653 922 words in the form of dialogues in a variety of communicative situations was analyzed. The program *WordSmith Tools* was used in the extraction and analysis of the data. Each occurrence of diminutive *-inho* was analyzed with respect to the surrounding context and the speech situation.

The results of the corpus analysis indicated a very low frequency of the “small size” meaning in comparison to the frequency in which the diminutive *-inho* was used for evaluative purposes or interactional strategies, revealing that the alleged “core meaning” of diminished size occupies only a peripheral position in the use of diminutive formations in Brazilian Portuguese. The data suggest that different aspects of interactional procedures are grammaticalized in the suffix *-inho*. The conclusion is that once the context is introduced to the analysis, the pragmatic and discursive dimensions of the process of diminutive formation reveal to be much more significant than has been previously acknowledged.

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Media concept as a context for the text

Media texts are often used as research data in various disciplines without proper look at the context of the text. We mean by context the whole media and the issue from which the text is gleaned. When analyzing the meaning of media contents for readers it is crucial to look at the whole magazine/newspaper when, not only at one text type. Media products are always compositions of several text genres (fiction, news, advertisement, photos etc) and this influences the interpretations.

The problem has been how to conceptualize and analyze each media as a context. Each media includes a wide variety of interest, practices as well the artifact itself. Among them are the media publisher's and the owners interests, audience needs, journalistic culture, organization structures and the daily practices of content production in media organizations.

We present media concept as a theoretical and methodological tool for analyzing media as a context. A media concept represents the logic that ties together the different perspectives, purposes and values of the participants involved in producing and consuming media products. A media concept is unique for each media product and constructs the characteristics by which it differs from other media products. A media concept is composed of three mutually constitutive components: - the societal situation, purpose and values of a publisher, audience needs, journalistic culture and technology - the organisational structure and division of labour and the architecture of the media product, e.g. a page plan of a magazine or newspaper and the daily work practices and journalistic tools for addressing the reader's needs and interests.

In our presentation we present several research cases we we have analyzed as media concepts in newspapers, magazines and web based media.

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Etusormella osoittaminen: sormenojennuksia esineisiin, ihmisiin ja ideoihin

Morrisin (1994) kyselytutkimuksen pohjalta tiedetään, että toisen ihmisen osoittamista etusormella pidetään monissa kulttuureissa epäkohteliaana ja epäsuotavana. Suomessakin vanhemmat usein opastavat jälkikasvuun, ettei pidä osoittaa ihmisiä epäkohteliaasti sormella. Kuitenkin henkilöihin osoitetaan toistuvasti myös neutraalisti ja myönteisessä hengessä, mutta tästä käytötavasta ollaan vähemmän tietoisia. Se, mitä henkilöt uskovat ja kertovat tekevänsä, eroaa siitä, miten ihmiset todellisuudessa toimivat.

Lausuma on pragmaattinen kokonaisuus, joka voidaan erottaa puheenvirrasta prosodisin ja toiminnallisista perusteista (ks. VISK). Eletutkimuksessa ajatellaan, että ele on integraali osa lausuman muodostamaa pragmaattista merkityskokonaisuutta. Eleitä voidaan tarkastella toisaalta funktiolähtöisesti, toisaalta muotoperustaisesti (Mittelberg 2007). Funktiolähtöistä lähestymistapaa on käytetty etenkin osoittamisen tutkimisessa. Tiedetäänkin hyvin, miten ja millaisia eleitä käytetään deiksiksi yhteydessä: osoittamiseen käytetään tyypillisesti etusormea, mutta myös avokämmentä, peukaloa, päätä, huulia ja katsetta käytetään usein, ja jopa jalkaa satunnaisesti (Kendon 2004). Etusormenojennusta voidaan kuitenkin käyttää muutoinkin kuin deiktisesti, joskin tieto muista käyttötavoista eri kielissä on satunnaismainintojen varassa (esim. Kendon 2004, Calbris 1990). Esityksessäni lähestyn osoittamista muotoperustaisesti esittelemällä, miten etusormenojennusta käytetään eri tavoin.

Funktioiden lisäksi osoittaminen voidaan jakaa kahteen pääkategoriaan sen mukaan, osoitetaanko henkilöihin (*personal pronominal pointing*) vai objekteihin (*external reference pointing*). Objekteihin osoittavat eleet voidaan edelleen jakaa neljään alakategoriaan sen mukaan, onko osoitettava objekti näköpiirissä (*current actual object pointing*) vai näköpiirin lähetyvillä mutta sen ulottumattomissa (*non-current actual object pointing*), luodaanko osoitettava objekti virtuaalisesti eletilään (*virtual object pointing*) vai osoitetaanko abstraktiin objektiin (*abstract object pointing*). (Kendon 2010.) Etenkin abstraktien objektien yhteydessä osoittaminen on tyypillisesti ns. pragmaattista, jolloin ele ohjaa lausuman affektiivista tulkintaa tai ele osoittaa keskustelun kulun loogista rakennetta. Muiden objektien osoittaminen on prototyypillisesti deiktistä.

Keskityn esityksessäni yhteen käsimuotoon, etusormella osoittamiseen, ja esitän, miten käyttöyhteys (osoituksen kohde ja osoituksen funktio) vaikuttaa eleen toteutukseen, kuten eleen orientaatioon, lokaatioon tai liikkeen suuntaan. Esittelen tapausesimerkein, miten eri tavoin osoittamista käytetään suomalaisessa kontekstissa, ja pohdin sormenojennuksen erilaisia merkityksiä eri yhteyksissä. Esimerkit on poimittu videoituista arkikeskusteluista, joita on yhteensä 6 tuntia seitsemästä eri tilanteesta.

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